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Given with language is nothing other than man’s capacity for speech, that is, 
for God. Nothing other than speech—which is speech only when it points to 
the otherness of God—is given with the fact human existence. To language 
belongs priority: primacy belongs to speech. And speaking calls for our words, 
a word is spoken only to the extent that language not only evokes but anticipates 
speech. Speech is the way in which our words anticipate a language; it is the way 
in which language is already ahead of itself. In the beginning was the Word and 
the Word became flesh: indeed, that Word alone is in the beginning which can 
become flesh, which is borne by the flesh and bom to it. Even our words’ aliena­
tion from the Word, the alienation of language from speech, discloses that words 
themselves cease to be at home in language unless theirs is the irreducible privilege 
of being constantly emancipated from it, unless theirs is the privilege of anticipat­
ing the Word. Language is already ahead of itself by being words. If thus language 
comprises what is said, what is unsaid carries language to ever newer horizons 
of meaning. What Hopper does not say is whether what is left unsaid is other than 
what is said. It seems at times that for Hopper the unsaid is merely what words 
cannot say, like blank spaces between them. Absolute immanentism and absolute 
supematuralism meet. And it could be that Hopper’s withdrawal from the super­
natural and his concomitant retreat into immanence have misled him to over­
look such a coincidence.
In fact I would say that all soteriologies based on a coincidentia oppoiitorum mistake 
the esc ba ton for the historidzation of salvation and cannot conceive of that which 
is unsaid, which is radically other, except by first opposing it and then reducing 
it to that which is said and is thus the only thing of which one can be “radically 
aware.” For there is a way in which the collective Unconscious is a surrogate for 
that kind of coincidence of opposites behind which lurks the twin seductive and 
idolatrous temptation which leads to Absolutism and supernatural Dualism and
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their respective powers of alienation. For just as a flower is not only more but 
also other than its petals, there is between God and man a difference which, 
eliminated by Monism and distorted by Dualism, is not done justice by either. 
“As butterflies come to the newly planted flowers, Bodhidharma says, CI know 
not*?’ Or, to paraphrase Buber, the Wholly Other is the Wholly Present only 
to the extent that he is experienced not merely as human reality but as radically 
other than the human reality with which his presence is precisely given. Indeed, 
to contend that God is nearer to me than I am to myself is, to say the least, slightly 
different from: “I am Thou, and Thou art I.” And in this respect Buber is to be 
preferred to Hopper, although surely Hopper would agree that the Eternal Thou 
can never be expressed, but can only be addressed. The radical integrity of man, 
which was jeopardized by the dualistic Absolutism of a supernatural entity 
identified as God, is no less undermined by the mere truncation ofTranscendance 
and its conflation with Immanence. And that is exactly the charge to which any 
conception of man’s wholeness that would eliminate rather than anticipate the 
otherness of God remains open. At which point the complaint I have just made 
must be diverted from Hopper to Buber.
Indeed it is wholeheartedly that in this respect I opt for Hopper against Buber, 
when the latter contends that the experience of the human reality is experience 
of the God who is the wholly Same, the Wholly Present, in contrast to the former 
who argues that such an experience—so long as it must be a human experience— 
cannot quite, by virtue of some implicit revelational positivism, dispose of the 
absence of God. To be sure, Heidegger’s own notion of the absence of God is, as 
Hopper himself points out, akin to Buber’s idea of the eclipse of God. And I am 
all the more surprised, therefore, that in rejecting Buber’s eclipse of God, Hopper 
is not led to question the metaphor of God’s absence put forth by his own mentor 
Heidegger. Accordingly, I am forced at this point to opt neither for Buber nor 
for Hopper: the former’s residual dualism is, to my mind, as objectionable as the 
latter’s case in favor of a covert coincidentia oppositorum. Either way, it seems to me 
that we are still held captive by the older picture of things, by the traditional view 
of the world, even though—and this must not be minimized—both Bubber and 
Hopper are very conscious of the cultural as well as religious mutation taking 
place in the texture of rhe human reality. And, indeed, for either one this muta­
tion, which affects not only our metaphysics but also our theology and language, 
is symbolized by the Death of God or a variant expression for the same pheno-
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menon: the eclipse of God (Buber) and the existential or cultural mistrust (Hop- 
per).
But, leaving Buber aside now, what exactly is this cultural or existential 
mistrust? In the following statement, Hopper gives us a clue: u__ the God of
whom I am not going to think anymore because he is dead continues to be very 
much alive in my thought of his deadness. In this sense the death of God theology 
runs the risk of remaining caught in the same language games with the theology 
that precedes it. Both belong to the same conceptual system. That is to say, 
neither the presence of God, in the one case, nor his ‘death’ in the other, has been 
thought infinitely.” Whereupon Hopper adds, without contradicting himself, 
that the problem at bottom “is not a problem of thought at all, but rather, in 
terms of the enigma a priori it is a question of being open to that which is prior 
to all thinking”, to the “symbol without meaning”, to the logos of things—to 
the logic of a new faith, a new mode of being, in which one sees as God sees, in 
which one cannot see except insofar as God sees, in which God is the verbal 
articulation of one’s being. There, however, one finds oneself located as though 
between two thoughts in a land of silence for which both the world and its God, 
because they are at once edifying and imprisoning, become a symbol signifying 
nothing: a symbol without meaning (Joseph Campbell). Land of silence, ours is 
the place where, post mortem Dei, between two thoughts, one may await the new 
name of God, the logos of things. And it follows that “logos, within this vision, 
becomes a metaphor for the speech of things, for expressiveness, and for the 
conception of ontology as utterance.” This brings us back to our point of de­
parture, namely to the linguistic nature of the human existence.
I agree with Hopper when he contends that each language draws a circle around 
us. I would depart from him by adding that each language is also iconoclastic of a 
previous one, lest it would content itself with being the mere adjuvant of some 
anamnestic process. Language is no mere reclaiming of a polder-like primordial 
nature; it is also proleptic convocation of man’s escbatic reality. Hopper himself 
would not, I think, disagree with this last point, since he too would object to the 
historicization of language concomitant with the objectifications of substantialist 
metaphysics.
Indeed, speaking is a naming of God. But what language can ever name God 
and be reduced to silence, to speechlessness? For to seek refuge in silence is to 
seek God beyond God, namely where he is not to be found. As Saint Augustine
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points out, what does one say when one speaks about God? But then, he adds, 
woe to those who pass him over into silence, especially if those that speak about 
him should be mute. Here, again, the question has nothing to do with either the 
pretence or the abtence of God; above all, it deals with the radical otbernest of God, 
so that God is an iconoclastic word about man and man is an iconoclastic word 
about God. Otherwise God becomes the possession of one’s creed or of one’s 
dogma, an item of one’s dictionary, an object, and, if God must not be possessed, 
there is no naming of God other than speaking. Where the Word becomes flesh, 
there is the eschatic point of convergence between the radical integrity of man and 
the radical otherness of God.
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